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Brigitte Clark* 
This article examines the uncertainties in the jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) relating to religious minorities, particularly 
case law involving families, and particularly children. In view of the 
increasingly religiously diverse and pluralist societies of the European Union, 
the ECtHR is required to ensure that, in terms of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR), both individuals and collective religious or non-
religious minorities are afforded religious freedom against so-called secular 
values which pursue majority interests, although there may be genuine cases 
where minority rights to freedom of religion need to be limited.  This article 
argues that, in several cases, the ECtHR, with respect, appears to have 
allowed some secular laws of various States which restrict the freedom of 
religious minorities, to prevail without the need to adequately justify such 
limitations.  Furthermore, the margin of appreciation doctrine has been widely 
used by the ECtHR, and has permitted States Parties to interpret religious 
rights and freedoms within the broader context of their national cultures, 
values and traditions. However, the argument that a lack of consensus 
between the laws of Contracting States allows a wide margin of appreciation 
may risk jeopardising the protection of minority religious rights, including those 
of children.  Although the margin of appreciation doctrine is integral and 
essential to the Convention’s system of constitutional-interpretive principles, it 
should be confined within acceptable limits, mainly by appreciating its 
subordination to the Convention’s primary constitutional principles and also its 
relationship with other secondary principles, particularly proportionality.  The 
ECtHR is urged to follow a careful and considered process of balancing of 
interests in the application of Article 9.2 to ensure that the legitimate interests 
of families of religious (and non-religious) minorities are protected, and to 
avoid a mechanistic or over-deferential application of the margin of 
appreciation doctrine. 
INTRODUCTION   
This article focuses on the uncertainties and lack of clarity in the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) over the 
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position of families and particularly children, as religious minorities in  
European Union countries. This uncertainly is particularly prevalent where 
conflicts arise in cases when parents assert their right to manifest their 
religious freedom or freedom from religion1 over the religious upbringing or 
education of their children.2   European societies have become increasingly 
diverse, as many religions, creeds, beliefs and non-beliefs offer their various 
visions of the ‘good life’ to their adherents.3   In this diverse society,4 
conflicting religious rules may also regulate some families5 and constitute a 
way of life for them.6   Marital and partner relationships are also increasingly 
inter-ethnic,7 which may lead to parental clashes between notions of what 
constitutes the right way of life, religion or education for the children 
concerned.8  
                                                 
*Senior Lecturer, Oxford Brookes University. My thanks go to Professor Peter Edge for all his 
patient assistance and encouragement. 
1 For example, in England and Wales, the proportion of the people who do not identify with 
any religion has now reached a quarter of the population (Office for National Statistics 
February 2014.) Since 2001 in England and Wales, there has been an increase in those 
reporting no religion from 14.8% of the population in 2001 to 25.1% in 2011 
2. According to  the British Social Attitudes Survey, affiliation to the Church of England fell from 
40% in 1983 to 20% in 2010 and 16% in 2013 (British Social Attitudes Survey No 31, 2014. ) 
3 Marie Claire Foblets ‘Family, Religion and Law in Europe: Embracing Diversity from the 
perspective ‘Cultural Encounters’ in Family, Religions and Law: Cultural Encounters in 
Europe edited by Prakash Shah with Marie Claire Foblets and Mathias Rohe (2014) (Ashgate 
Publishing (England) xi at xv. 
4 The 2011 Census has shown that the population in England and Wales has become more 
ethnically diverse. In 2011, 1.2 million people identified themselves as mixed ethnicity, up 
from 660,000 in 2001. The Office for National Statistics analysis provides further insight into 
diversity by looking at patterns and trends of people living as a couple in an inter-ethnic 
relationship (Office of National Statistics 2011 Census.) 
5 British Social Attitudes Survey No 31, 2014.   
6 Despite falling numbers, Christianity remains the main religion in England and Wales in 
2011. In the 2011 Census, Christians were the largest religious group, with 33.2 million 
people (59.3% of the population (Office for National Statistics February 2014). Muslims 
comprise the next biggest religious group and have grown in the last decade. Between 2001 
and 2011 there were increases in the other main religious group categories. Muslims grew 
the most (British Social Attitudes No 28, 2011, and No 31, 2014.) 
7 Inter-ethnic relationships are defined as relationships between couples that are either 
married, in a civil partnership or cohabiting where each partner identifies with an ethnic group 
different from the other. 2.3 million people in the United Kingdom live in an inter-ethnic 
relationship (Office of National Statistics ‘Religious Ethnicity Analysis’ September 2014.) One 
in eight households now contain more than one ethnic group (‘Mapping the Dynamics of 
Diversity’ Office for National Statistics September 2014).  Nearly 1 in 10 people living as a 
couple was in an inter-ethnic relationship in 2011(Part of 2011 Census Analysis, What does 
the 2011 Census tell us about inter-ethnic relationships Release?)   It has been predicted that 
by 2051, the ethnic minority population will more than double due to a baby boom among 
epode of /Pakistani, Bangladeshis and African origin.  Also more than one in four Britons will 
be from Black and minority ethnic groups.  (Richard Ford ‘ Quarter of Britons will be from an 
Ethnic Minority within Decades’ The Times 20 April 2015, page 4.) 
8 Jürgen Habermas ‘Religion in the Public Sphere’ (2006) 14 (1) European Journal of 
Philosophy 1-25. 
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      In these increasingly pluralist societies,9 the ECtHR has the task of 
assessing the relationship between aspects of family law and religion, 
particularly religious upbringing and education.10  In terms of the ECHR, both 
individuals and collective religious or non-religious minorities should be 
afforded  protection in the exercise of religious freedom against obligations 
stemming from  legal provisions that pursue majority interests, unless such 
rights to freedom of religion need to be limited, justifiably and legitimately.  
This article argues that, in several cases, the ECtHR, with respect, seems to 
hold that the States’ secular laws may prevail without the need to adequately 
justify such limitations.11  
     For the first thirty years of its operation, the ECtHR did not determine any 
cases against any state on the basis of Article 9 of the ECHR.  However, 
since 1993,12 the ECtHR has now considered more than fifty Article 9 
decisions, indicating the rapidly increasing significance of the ECtHR in 
matters relating to religious freedom.13   A growing body of scholarship offers 
critical analyses of the ECtHR’s religious freedom judgments.14 Of eighteen 
such cases heard in the ECtHR between 2001 to 2014, in only two cases was 
a violation of the right to religious freedom (Article 9 of the ECHR) 
established.  
     Although, in some cases, the ECtHR has been prepared to attach value to 
the concept of pluralism in connection with the protection of freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion,15 generally the right of religious and non-
religious minorities to manifest freedom of religion or belief appears to have 
been cautiously approached.  In some cases, the ECtHR has avoided the 
strict application of the proportionality test by refusing to find that, in cases of 
conflict between the religious obligations of minority groups and ostensibly 
‘secular’ laws, there is any state interference with the exercise of freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion.   This article considers these cases in the 
context of Article 9, Article 2 Protocol 1, Article 8 and  the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and the decisions of its 
Committee.  
 
                                                 
9 Rowan Williams ‘Civil and Religious Law in England: A Religious Perspective’ (2008) 
volume 10 (3) Ecclesiastical Law Journal pp 262-282; Rupert Shortt Rowan’s Rule: The 
Biography of the Archbishop’ (Hodder) 2014.  
10 Jurgen Habermas  ‘Notes on a Post-Secular Society’ (2008) Sign and sigh.com.  Let’s talk 
Europe’.   
11 Javier Martinez Torron ‘Religious Pluralism: the case of the ECHR’ chapter 7 in 
Democracy, Law and Religious Pluralism in Europe (Edited by Ferran Requejo and Camil 
Ungureanu) (Routledge) (2014) 123 at 126. 
12 Kokkinakis v Greece (1994) 17 EHRR 397 (ECHR).   
13 Effie Fokas ‘Directions in Religious Pluralism in Europe: Mobilisation in the Shadow of 
European Court of Human Rights Religious Freedom Jurisprudence’ (2015) 4 Oxford Journal 
of Law and Religion 54 at 60. 
14 Carolyn Evans and Christopher Thomas ‘Church-State Relations in European Court of 
Human Rights’ (2006) 3 Brigham Young University Law Review 699; Effie Fokas ‘Directions 
in Religious Pluralism in Europe: Mobilisation in the Shadow of European Court of Human 
Rights Religious Freedom Jurisprudence’ (2015) 4 Oxford Journal of Law and Religion 54 at 
60. 
15 Kokkinakis v Greece 25 May 1993, para 31. 
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THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF BELIEF, THOUGHT, CONSCIENCE AND 
RELIGION 
   Article 9 (1) of the ECHR states that everyone has the right to freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion.  This right includes freedom to change his 
religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in 
public or private, to manifest his religion16 or belief, in worship, teaching, 
practice and observance.  When considering which religions or beliefs qualify 
for protection in terms of article 9, the Convention (ECHR) clearly 
distinguishes between the absolute right of freedom of thought, conscience, 
belief and religion, and the potentialy limited right to ‘manifest' such religion or 
beliefs in Article 9(2).  In the assessment of what qualifies as ‘belief’,17 the 
ECtHR in Kokkinakis18 stressed the importance of the protection of pluralism 
in a democratic country, taking into account non-religious convictions as a 
reason for granting exemptions from general rules.19 In the case of non-
religious belief systems, such systems may have to indicate that they have 
reached such a level of seriousness and coherence as to warrant the law’s 
protection.20   Article 9 protects not only religious beliefs. It protects all kinds 
of philosophical beliefs, sincerely held and internally coherent.  This case 
underlined that Article 9 is a precious asset, not only for the believer but also 
for atheists, agnostics, and sceptics because it also protects the right not to 
believe. 
   A restriction on such rights is permitted, but only if it is justifiable and 
legitimate in terms of article 9(2).  The ECtHR is faced with considerable 
challenges where the rights of religious minorities to freedom of religion or 
belief conflict with those of the majority faith.21  The principle of 
                                                 
16 In this context, religion is not easy to define.  In  R (Hodkin & Anor) v Registrar General of 
Births, Deaths and Marriages [2013] UKSC 77 at para [57]. Lord Toulson described it as: 
“.. a spiritual or non-secular belief system, held by a group of adherents, which claims 
to explain mankind’s place in the universe and relationship with the infinite… 
This description emphasises the non-secular aspect and its group character, but excludes the 
requirement of belief in a supreme deity, indicating how much broader the understanding of 
religion in contemporary society has become.  Although in this case Lord Toulson 
emphasised that this definition only applies to the Place of Worship Registration Act 1855, it 
is likely to have far-reaching effects (see Russell Sandberg ‘Defining the Divine’ (2014) 16 
Ecclesiastical Law Journal 198 at 201-2.) This description appears to exclude secular beliefs 
which qualify for protection as ‘beliefs’ rather than ‘religion.’   
17 In R (on the application of Hodkin and another) v Registrar General of Births, Deaths and 
Marriages  [2014] 1 FCR 577 the English Supreme Court held that expression 'place of 
meeting for religious worship' in s 2 of the 1855 Act was to be interpreted in accordance with 
a contemporary understanding of religion. Scientology was within that approach to the 
meaning of religion (para [31].) 
18 (1994) 17 EHRR 397 (ECHR).   
19 Kokassinis v Greece (1994) 17 EHRR 397 (ECHR).  Cristina Lafont ‘Religious Pluralism in 
a Deliberative Democracy’ in Democracy, Law and the Religious Pluralism in Europe: 
Secularism and Post-secularism (edited by Ferran Requejo and Camil Ungureanu) 
(Routledge) (New York and Oxford) (2014) chapter 3 page 46. 
20 Baroness Hale ‘Secular Judges and Christian Law’ (2015) 17 Ecclesiastical Law Journal 
170 at 173. in Campbell and Cosans v The United Kingdom, the parents objected to corporal 
punishment at their children’s schools on the grounds that it was contrary to their 
philosophical convictions.  The ECtHR took the view that those convictions had to ‘attain a 
certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance’ in order to engage the ECHR 
and be worthy of respect. 
21 Lady Hale ‘Are we a Christian country? Religious freedom and the law’ 
Oxfordshire High Sheriff’s Lecture 2014 14 October 2014 (Oxford). 
 5 
proportionality provides a valuable framework for the line of enquiry into 
whether the restriction on the right concerned is justifiable in terms of a set 
structure of enquiry.  Firstly, the Court should enquire as to whether there has 
been interference and, secondly, whether the interference is justified.  In most 
cases, the question of whether there has been interference is a formality. 
However, various filters have been developed such as the definition of a belief 
(a world view held with a degree of cogency, serious reflection and 
importance); the ‘specific situation’ rule (which examines whether a person 
has voluntarily submitted themselves to the situation such as employment) 
and the motivation for the practice (is it religious?).  It would seem that in 
recent case law the use of filtering devices has become increasingly limited.22   
     On the first question, the law cannot legitimately inquire into the validity23 
or importance of those beliefs, or any particular manifestation of them, as long 
as they are genuinely held.  The challenge for the ECtHR is to reach a 
decision without an overt evaluation of different religions,24 and without unduly 
jeopardising the protection of religious minorities, for whom the protection 
offered by human rights is a significant part of the democratic process and the 
balancing and proportionality test.25    
   On the second issue, there are various questions that are asked although 
there are some differences in the way they are framed.  These differences in 
formulation and practice need not detract from the claim that proportionality is 
the jus cogens of human rights law, any more than the existence of different 
theories of rights poses an obstacle to the ascendance of rights discourse.  
Questions to be asked at this stage are: is the legislation (or other 
government action) establishing the limitation of the right pursuing a legitimate 
objective of sufficient importance to warrant limiting such a right?  Are the 
means rationally connected to the objective?  Are the means necessary, 
taking into account alternative means of achieving the same objective?  Is 
there a fair balance between the public interest and the private right? 
In some cases, the ECtHR has held that legal restrictions on freedom of 
religion and belief may be reasonable when they seek to guarantee the 
secularity of the public sphere.26 This approach, interpreting secularity as  
being synonomous with neutrality, implies that religion cannot be a part of  
public sphere and the public sphere should be presided over by a secularism  
that permits the presence of non-religious ideas or signs, but not their  
religious equalivent.27    With respect, this approach seems to avoid a  
rigorous application of the proportionality exercise and creates an unduly  
secular approach, which prevails unjustifiably over the market place, and  
appears to be sanctioned by a loose concept of the margin of appreciation.  
This is a problem that has been posed in 'multicultural societies,' in which 
                                                 
22 Eweida and others v United Kingdom, 15 January 2013, para 81.  
23 Lady Hale has pointed out that, if the law is going to protect freedom of religion and belief, it 
has to accept all religions and beliefs (Lady Hale ‘Are we a Christian country? Religious 
freedom and the law’ Oxfordshire High Sheriff’s Lecture 2014 14 October 2014 (Oxford)). 
24 Baroness Hale ‘Secular Judges and Christian Law’ (2015) 17 Ecclesiastical Law Journal 
170 at 173. 
25 Para 2. 
26 SAS v France (Application Number 43835/11). 
27 Efstratiou v Greece, 18 December 1996 and Valsamis v Greece, 18 December 1996 but 
c.f. decision of the Grand Chamber in Lautsi v Italy (GC) 18 March 2011, Para 74, 66; Eweida 
and others v United Kingdom, 15 January 2013, para 81.   
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a minority's attachment to religious or cultural community may be 
opposed to the majority's apparently secularized citizenship.  In such  
circumstances, the principle of autonomy in liberal democracy may be 
forced to give way to the exigencies of the secular state. 28  With 
'secularism' may come the need to conceive and practise the observance 
and celebration of the values, symbols, and signs of recognition which 
indicate the adhesion to the community of majoritarian views.29 
 
THE APPLICATION OF THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION DOCTRINE  
The doctrine of the margin of appreciation arose to balance the diverse 
interpretations of the ECHR by member states. 30    The ECtHR is 
generally more deferential to States Parties challenged with the 
infringement of ECHR rights where there is little evidence of a 
European consensus on the correct interpretation of a human right. By 
the same token, where agreement on an issue is more widespread, the 
margin of appreciation is less wide. 31   Where there is little or no 
agreement, States Parties are able to interpret the ECHR according to 
their unique perspective and implement laws that may be, in some 
cases, not fully appropriate for religious minorities with different value 
systems. 
     The structure and context of the ECHR is couched in language that 
requires the balancing of competing interests in accordance with the 
principles of proportionality, universality and diversity.32  Universality implies a 
guarantee of an equal degree of protection of the freedom of religion and 
belief to all individuals and groups whether as members of a majority or 
minority group. The necessary balance between diversity and universality is 
contained in the doctrine of the margin of appreciation, which allows a 
national variation in the limitation that States can legitimately impose on the 
freedoms guaranteed by different articles of the ECHR.  Thus, diversity may, 
in practice, imply some limitation on the consequences of universality since 
States must be allowed a reasonable margin of appreciation when a limitation 
on freedom becomes necessary.   
    Limitations on the exercise of the freedom of religion may be justifiably 
imposed when prescribed by law or in the legitimate interest of the protection 
of public order, health or morals or protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others and such limitations should be necessary in a democratic society. 
Where there is a lack of consensus among the States of the European Union, 
the margin of appreciation gives national authorities some discretionary power 
                                                 
28 Stewart Motha ‘Veiled Women and the Affect Of Religion In Democracy’ (2007) 34 Journal of 
Law And Society p. 139-62. 
29 Jean- Luc Nancy ‘Church, State, Resistance’  (2007) 34 Journal of 
Law and Society p. 3-13. 
30 James A. Sweeney ‘Margins of Appreciation: Cultural Relativity and the European Court of 
Human Rights in the Post-Cold War Era’ (2005) 54 International and   Comparative Law 
Quarterly  459 (2005). 
31 Eyal Benvenisti, ‘Margin of Appreciation, Consensus, and Universal Standards’ (1998) 31 
New York University Journal International Law and  Policy 843  
32 Javier Martinez-Torron‘Freedom of Religion in the ECHR under the Influence of Different 
European Traditions’ (2012) accessed at 
http://www.pass.va/content/dam/scienzesociali/pdf/acta17/acta17-martineztorron.pdf 
5 September 2016. 
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to determine when limitations on the exercise of religious freedoms are 
necessary and therefore legitimate.  However, the ECtHR has its own 
discretionary power to intervene if it considers that national states have used 
their discretion unreasonably or if any restrictive measures adopted have not 
respected the principle of proportionality. 
     Thus, although the margin of appreciation doctrine is integral and essential 
to the Convention’s system of constitutional-interpretive principles, it should 
be confined within acceptable limits, mainly by appreciating its subordination 
to the Convention’s primary constitutional principles and also its relationship 
with other secondary principles, particularly proportionality.  Although the 
ECtHR has signalled its deference to the national margin of appreciation 
doctrine, a strict proportionality approach might bring about a welcome 
reduction of such deference.  
THE PROHIBITION OF RELIGIOUS DRESS IN EDUCATIONAL SETTINGS 
For children growing up in religious minorities, the right to education includes 
promotion and respect for their distinctiveness as well as the development of 
individual right to an open future.  Thus, the individual right to education must 
be viewed against the context of the collective right to allow religious 
minorities their identity.  Where conflict arises between equality of opportunity 
and religious minority rights, these cases should be decided in favour of 
equality of opportunity for children. 33   However, different considerations may 
arise where the minority right does not conflict with any right to education but 
only with majority interests.  In such cases, it is argued that proportionality and 
the margin of appreciation should give way to the right of minorities to practise 
their religion or non-belief in a pluralist Europe.   
     In the educational context, the ECtHR has tended to justify restrictions of 
individual expression of religious beliefs in terms of Article 9.2.  The ECtHR 
has sanctioned restrictions on religious dress, allegedly in the interests of 
peace and tolerance.34  In Dahlab v Switzerland,35 the applicant was a 
primary school teacher who converted to Islam and wished to wear the 
Islamic headscarf when teaching and was dismissed for doing so.  She 
argued that this prohibition infringed her freedom to manifest her religion.  The 
Geneva authorities weighed the right of the teacher to manifest her religion 
against the need to protect pupils between the ages of 4 and 8 by preserving 
religious harmony.  The Swiss authorities concluded that, having regard to the 
young age of her pupils, the measure did not exceed their margin of 
appreciation and was not unreasonable.    On appeal, the ECtHR failed to 
question whether the Swiss authorities’ attitude should be more inclusive and 
pluralist to permit students to perceive in their own school a reflection of the 
different religions existing in Swiss society.  Nor did the ECtHR fully address 
the issues of whether the banning of the Islamic headscarf could be assessed 
as a legitimate response to the need to preserve peace and tolerance.  It was 
said to be impossible to assess the potential proselytizing effect on children of 
a powerful external symbol such as the teacher wearing a hijab.  
                                                 
33 Holly Cullen – ‘Education Rights or Minority Rights?’ (1993) 7 International Journal of Law 
and Policy 143.  
34 Dahlab v Switzerland 2001-V ECHR 447. 
35 Dahlab v Switzerland 2001-V ECHR 447. 
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     In similar vein, in Sahin v Turkey36 the ECtHR allowed the limitation on the 
grounds that the neutrality of the public sphere is best served when religion is 
absent. In this case, Leyla Sahin was a fifth year medical student at the 
University of Istanbul who came from a traditional family of practising Muslims 
and considered it her religious duty to wear the Islamic headscarf.  She defied 
a letter from the Vice-Chancellor of the University forbidding her to wear the 
headscarf and eventually was excluded from the University and argued that 
the ban on wearing the scarf constituted an unjustified interference with her 
right to freedom of religion and in particular her right to manifest her religion.  
The ECtHR concluded that, though her freedom had been interfered with, this 
was necessary in a democratic society and gave a very wide meaning to 
indoctrination (based in the margin of appreciation permitted to countries.)                 
In this case, the ECtHR appears to have failed to fully analyse the necessity 
and the proportionality of the ban.  The Court accepted that the banning of the 
headscarf contravened secularism, but failed to establish that the applicant 
wore the headscarf in order to provoke a reaction or proselytise or alter the 
convictions of others.  The ECtHR could not discern any factor, which could 
have suggested that Miss Sahin had fundamental views and also did not 
prove that the ban promoted sexual equality.  The ECtHR failed, with respect, 
to establish that the ban was proportionate.   
     Sequels to Sahin37 were the justification of the French ban on religious 
garments in public schools and public places,38 in schools justified because of 
the hypothetical argument of the threat to the principle of laicite (or secularism 
in public places)39 which may conflict with the rights of religious minorities.  
Differential treatment is acceptable to some extent, as long as it is justified 
and pursues legitimate objectives. In Dogru and Kervanci 40 the ECtHR held 
that it was legitimate to expel two twelve-year old female students from their 
state school on the grounds that they had refused to remove their 
headscarves in physical education classes.  The school authorities justified 
the decision by alleging health and safety reasons. It appeared that the school 
authorities had rejected, without providing any reason, the applicants’ offers to 
wear a hat or balaclava instead of a headscarf in order to ensure that their 
religious obligations were compatible with the school’s health and safety rules, 
the ECtHR held unanaimousaly that the expulsion was justifiable. These 
decisions were followed by six decisions in 2009 in which the applicants were 
students who had been expelled from schools in different French towns in the 
2004 French laws against personal religious symbols in state schools. 41   On 
the grounds that they persistently wore religious clothing,  the Court held that 
the disciplinary measures imposed were justified, despite the fact that the 
prohibition was not limited to sports classes, but extended to all school hours 
                                                 
36 Sahin v Turkey (2005) 41 EHRR 8.   
37 (2005) 41 EHRR 8.   
38 SAS v France (Application Number 43835/11). 
39 [2008] ECRR 1579.  
40 [2008] ECRR 1579. Both decisions made on 4 December 2008. 
41 Decisions made on 30 June 2009:  Aktas v France 43563/08; Bayrak v France 14308/08; 
Gamadeddyn v France 18527/08; Ghazal v France 29134/08; Jasvir Singh v France 
25463/08; Ranjit Singh v France 275611/08. 
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and premises.   The Court refused to offer a full judgement on the merits of 
these cases but declared them inadmissible as ‘manifestly unfounded’.  
       The headscarf ban for both pupils and children appears to be 
motivated by the desire to protect the religious freedom of children who do 
not wear headscarves in the belief that children will get a better education 
in a school context that is free from religion.  However, neither the 
individual child’s best interests (as contained in article 3(1) of the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)) nor the concept of 
the child’s autonomy have been overtly considered.  Nor does the age of 
the pupil appear to have been a relevant factor.42   Thus the interpretation 
of Article 9 by the ECtHR in Dahlab,43 confirmed in Sahin44 has validated 
the imposition of restrictions on minority religions in cases involving cultural 
and religious diversity.45 Restrictions on religious dress thus appear to be 
sanctioned by the ECtHR in the interests of living together where the veil 
conceals the whole face,46 or in the context of education, for example, for 
teachers (Dahlab v Switzerland),47 and students (Sahin and Karaduman v 
Turkey).48  However, restrictions on dress have been disallowed when they 
are considered to have been applied disproportionately (Eweida et al v 
UK).49 Where the restriction was in line with a so-called secular approach, 
the court seems ready to allow it - as within the margin of appreciation.50   
      In regard to the right to wear religious dress, Strasbourg jurisprudence 
generally seems to take the approach that this right falls within the margin of 
appreciation of individual states to determine how best the compromise 
should be struck between respect for religious freedom and the protection of 
the rights of others. The ECtHR appears to be hesitant to rule in favour of 
granting too much protection to freedom of religion or belief, especially where 
it may be detrimental to the authority and power of a secular state and against 
majority interests.51  
FEMALE CHILDREN AND WOMEN FROM RELIGIOUS MINORITIES: 
OBSERVING THEIR RIGHTS TO RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
In terms of the ECHR, States are required to ‘fully protect… women against 
all violations of their rights based on or attributed to religion.’52   At times, 
                                                 
42 Eva Brems  ‘Above Children’s Heads: The Headscarf Controversy in European Schools 
from the Perspective of Children’s Rights’ (2006) 14 International Journal of Children’s Rights 
119 at 132.   
43 Dahlab v Switzerland 2001-V ECHR 447. 
44 Sahin v Turkey (2005) 41 EHRR 8.   
45 Article 18(4).  Under the ICCPR, States undertook to have respect for the liberty of parents 
to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their 
convictions. The same wording is used in Article 13(3) of the ICESCR. 
46 SAS v France (Application Number 43835/11). 
47 Dahlab v Switzerland 2001-V ECHR 447. 
48 Sahin v Turkey (2005) 41EHRR 8. rights.  
49 Eweida and Others v UK (2013) 57 EHRR 8. 
50 E.g. Dahlab v Switzerland 2001-V ECHR 447. 
51 J Martinez-Torron ‘The Case of the European Court of Human Rights’ Democracy , Law 
and Religious Pluralism in Europe’ edited by Ferran Requejo and Camil Ungureanu (2014) 
(Routledge, Taylor and Francis) (London and New York) p 136. 
52 Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly Res. 1464 (2005) on Women and Religion in 
Europe, 15 September 2005, Doc 10670, at Para. 7.1; Human Rights Committee, General 
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‘religion is one of the chief perpetrators of women’s subjugation, inequality, 
lower social status, lack of equal treatment and protection, and internalised 
notions of inferiority’.53   However, in the case of female children, the veil, 
burqua (and burkini) debates frequently demonstrate that such arguments 
about the compatibility of religion and women’s rights cannot be made and 
in this respect, at times, secular law may be guilty of side-lining women’s 
human rights.   
     Some women may wish to exercise their right of choice in religious 
dress, even though this mode of dress may appear to others to indicate 
subjugation.  For example, in S.A.S. v. France, 54 the ECtHR held, by a 
majority, that the French law that made it illegal for anyone to conceal their 
face in public places did not violate the ECHR. The French Government 
listed three values in favour of the ban: respect for gender equality, respect 
for human dignity and respect for the minimum requirements of life in 
society (or of “living together”).  While dismissing the arguments relating to 
the first two of those values, the Court accepted that a veil concealing the 
face in public raised a barrier against others which could undermine the 
notion of “living together” and therefore could be regarded as necessary for 
protecting the rights and freedoms of others in a democratic society and to 
create social harmony.   
     The French Government did not utilise public order as a possible 
justification, preferring instead to invoke the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others.  After determining that the ban constitutes a 
limitation of those rights that has been prescribed by law, the ECtHR 
considered whether France had a legitimate aim in enacting the ban. 
The Court emphasised that the law aims to ensure the respect for the 
minimum set of values of an open and democratic society.  These 
values are respect for equality between men and women, for human 
dignity; and for the minimum requirements of life in society. The ECtHR 
was not convinced by the French Government’s argument that 
concerns for respect for equality between men and women justified the 
ban on the wearing of the full-face veil,55 nor did the ECtHR accept that 
respect for human dignity justified a blanket ban on the wearing of the 
full-face view in public places.   
     However, the majority of the ECtHR held that the ban did correspond 
with the legitimate aim of protecting the rights and freedoms of others.56    
After finding that the ban is premised on a legitimate state objective, the 
Court embarked on a necessity test by weighing up whether the ban 
was proportionate to the legitimate aim. The majority of the ECtHR 
stated that the ban did not constitute a proportionate response to an 
argument based on public safety. However, it found that the ban was 
proportionate to the goal of promoting “living together.”  The ECtHR 
emphasised that the ban is not directly targeted at Muslim women but 
rather towards the practice of concealing the face, which, if hidden, 
                                                 
Comment No 28: Equality of Rights between Men and Women (Article 3), 29 March 2004 
CCPR/C/Rev.1/Add/10.   
53 S.A.S. v France  Application Number 43835/11. 
54 Application Number 43835/11.   
55 At Paragraph 118.At paragraph 120. 
56 SAS v France at para 22. 
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prevents socialisation.   The majority of the ECtHR concluded that it 
was correct to defer to the French Government’s values in terms of the 
margin of appreciation.  For the majority of the ECtHR, facial 
communication was assumed to be essential in contemporary society 
and vital for the functioning of society. The argument of respect for the 
minimum requirements of life in society or of “living together” was 
considered by the ECtHR to have justified and legitimated the 
imposition of the ban.57   The majority of the ECtHR found that this 
means was necessary in a democratic society,58 but failed to explain 
why the law should back this social expectation, relying over- heavily 
on the margin of appreciation, and justifying its stance by arguing that 
the trifling nature of the sanctions imposed on violation of the ban made 
the restriction proportionate.59      
     By contrast, the two dissenting judges (the ECtHR was divided 15:2) 
argued that it is wrong to allow abstract rights to trump concrete rights. 
For them, the general concept of ‘living together’ (vivre ensemble) did 
not fall directly under any of the rights and freedoms guaranteed within 
the European Convention and the social duty to engage with French 
fellow citizens was not seen to be at stake.     
       Although the careful analysis of the position of women is a positive 
feature, SAS60 does not give similar domestic cases much scope to support 
minority rights.  The reasoning of the ECtHR may have serious 
consequences for such groups if the insensitivity to the fragility of religious 
minority rights continues to prevail.   In one case, the ECtHR appears to 
regard certain aspects of the Islamic religion as incompatible with 
democratic values.61  At other times, the ECtHR appears to value an 
alleged State assertion of protection of gender equality above the 
protection of the right of the children or women themselves to religious 
manifestation.62  This may disempower some girls, as members of a 
religious minority, limiting their right of choice and free will.  It may, in fact, 
operate contrary to essential gender equality by imposing coercive 
measures on those from religious minorities who do not observe the 
majority religion.  This right to equality involves the right to participate on an 
equal footing within the deliberative process of shaping the context and 
transforming the collective understanding of what is compatible with gender 
equality, non-discrimination, and freedom of religion, in the light of the 
special circumstances in that particular religious minority or community.63    
                                                 
57 At paragraph 120.   
58 Paragraph 155. 
59 Application Number 43835/11 at paragraph 152. 
60 SAS v France (Application Number 43835/11). 
61 Rerefah Partisi (The Welfare Party) and Others v Turkey 37 EHRR 1. 
62 Sahin v Turkey (2005) 41 EHRR 8.; Dahlab v Switzerland 2001-V ECHR 447; SAS v 
France (Application Number 43835/11).  
63 Cristina Lafont ‘Religious Pluralism in a Deliberative Democracy’ in Democracy, Law and 
Religious Pluralism in Europe edited by Ferran Requejo and Camil Ungureanu (Routledge) 
(New York and Oxford) (2014) chapter 3 p 46 at p 57. If these women appeal to equality 
arguments  - the unequal treatment involved in denying a certain group of citizens the right to 
freely exercise their religion or to freely chose how to dress, they may also individually argue 
that anti-discrimination law (such as the UK Equality Act section 2) justifies their opposition to 
the ban and, furthermore, that those in favour of such a ban are under a duty to examine 
these objections and to offer convincing reasons to legitimise the imposition of the ban.  The 
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PARENTAL ENTITLEMENT TO RESPECT FOR THEIR PHILOSOPHICAL 
AND RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS 
In the exercise of any of the functions that it assumes in regard to teaching 
and education, the State shall respect the right of parents to ensure such 
education and teaching is in conformity with their own religious and 
philosophical convictions,64 provided that such convictions are cogent and 
coherent.65 In Campbell and Cosans v The United Kingdom,66 the parents 
objected to corporal punishment at their children’s schools on the grounds 
that it was contrary to their philosophical convictions.  The ECtHR took the 
view that those convictions had to ‘attain a certain level of cogency, 
seriousness, cohesion and importance’ in order to engage the ECHR and be 
worthy of respect.67  The ECtHR has, in many cases involving education and 
religious organisations, stated, as a general principle, that a State is forbidden 
to pursue the aim of indoctrination and must ensure that religious knowledge 
is conveyed in an objective, critical and pluralist manner.68   
     In Zengin v Turkey,69 where a Turkish citizen residing in Istanbul, requested 
that his daughter be exempted from a mandatory course on religious culture 
and ethics, since he and his family were followers of Alevism, a branch of 
Islam, which rejects some of the religious code of Sharia law.70 Zengin 
                                                 
rights of mature girls to make religious choices, such as the right to wear the nijab, are 
inherent within the concept of gender equality.    
 
 
64 Article 2, Protocol 1 provides that no person shall be denied the right to education.  
(This right was ratified by the UK, subject to the reservation that the right to education would 
be adhered to only insofar as is compatible with the provision of efficient instruction and 
training and the avoidance of unreasonable expenditure (Education Act 1996, section 375.)) 
 
65 Campbell and Cosans v The United Kingdom (1982) 4 EHRR 293. 
66 Campbell and Cosans v The United Kingdom (1982) 4 EHRR 293. 
67 In similar vein but interpreting Article 9 of the ECHR,  the  House of Lords in R (Williamson) 
v Secretary of State for Education [2005] UKHL 15, [2005] 2 WLR 590 at paras [23] – [24] 
adopted a pluralist approach  where an application was made by parents in favour of the use 
of corporal punishment in the Christian education of their children at Christian schools.  The 
House of Lords held that the ‘belief’ in the use of corporal punishment was protected by 
Article 9, emphasising that it was not its role to embark on an inquiry into the asserted belief 
and judge its validity by some objective standard, since freedom of religion protects the 
subjective belief of these parents, however misguided.67  By contrast, when the question of 
what constituted ‘manifestation’ arose, the belief was required to satisfy some objective 
minimum requirements. The ban on the use of corporal punishment was held to be a justified 
and proportionate interference with the expression of a belief in the interests of protection of 
the children involved. The case was decided within the analysis of whether the interference 
with the expression of the belief was justifiable and proportionate. 
68 Folgero & Others v Norway (2008) 46 EHRR 47 by a 9:8 Majority. 
69 (2008) 46 EHRR 44. 
70 Zengin was arguing that the mandatory religious culture and ethics course was in conflict 
with Turkey's fundamental principle of secularism. The Directorate turned down Zengin's 
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appealed to the ECtHR, which held that there was a violation of article 2 of 
the First Protocol on the grounds that, not only did the mandatory course on 
religious culture and ethics not meet the ECHR's standard of objectivity and 
pluralism, but also the content of the course failed to respect Zengin’s 
religious and philosophical convictions.  The ECtHR unanimously held that, 
although the course instruction did not rise to the level of indoctrination, the 
content of the lesson did not meet the criteria of objectivity and pluralism.   
Furthermore, the compulsory course lacked adequate instruction on the Alevi 
faith so did not respect Zengin’s religious and philosophical convictions.  Even 
though the state had instituted an exemption policy for that pupil whose 
religion conflicted with the required course, the ECtHR rejected the exemption 
as an inappropriate method of ensuring respect for parents’ religious 
philosophical convictions. 
      In similar vein, in Folgero and Others v Norway,71 the ECtHR indicated its 
awareness of the risk of indoctrination in education and recognised that the 
State has a positive obligation to fulfill in terms of education to ensure that 
information or knowledge in the curriculum is conveyed in an objective, critical 
and pluralist manner, to respect the limits implied by Article 2 protocol 1.  This 
case, along with Zengin v Turkey,72 suggested that the States’ accommodation 
of religion would be stringently controlled, with an emphasis on an objective 
and critical approach to the parental right.73 The principle of non-indoctrination 
appears to be a suitable tool to ensure religious minorities retained the right to 
freedom of and from religion, although it may be difficult to asses when 
indoctrination is occurring. 74    In some cases, the difference between 
indoctrination and stonrgly instillingThe goal of objective, critical and pluralistic 
religious instruction would respect the rights of religious minorities and those 
who desire freedom from religion as non-believers. 
     In the Italian case of Lautsi,75, Ms Lautsi, living in a predominantly 
Catholic area, argued, in her own name and on behalf of her two children 
(aged 11 and 13) that the display of the crucifix in the Italian State school 
attended by her children was contrary to her human right to ensure her 
children’s education and teaching was in conformity with her religious and 
philosophical convictions, within the meaning of Article 2, protocol 1 and 
the display of the cross had also breached her freedom of religion as 
protected by Article 9.  In response, the Italian Government argued that the 
display of a religious symbol in a public place did not exceed the margin of 
appreciation left to States and did not breach the State's duty of impartiality 
and neutrality since there was no European consensus on the concept of 
secularism in practice, with the result that States were given a wide margin 
of appreciation in this area.  
                                                 
request. Zengin applied to the Istanbul Administrative Court and again unsuccessfully to 
the Supreme Administrative Court.   
71 (2008) 46 EHRR 47 by a 9:8 Majority.   
72 Zengin v Turkey (2008) 46 EHRR 44. 
73 Campbell and Cusans v The United Kingdom [1982] ECtHR (Nos. 7511/76 & 7743/76) (25 
February 1982). 
74 Rachel E Taylor ‘Responsibility for the Soul of the Child: The Role of the State and Parents 
in Determining Religious Upbringing and Education’ (2015 ) 29 International  Journal of Law, 
Policy and the Family 15 
75 Lautsi v Italy Grand Chamber, 18 March 2011, Application no 30814/06.   
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     The Chamber of the Second Section of the European Court of Human 
Rights held that in countries where the vast majority of the population 
adhered to one religion, the manifestation of the observances of a symbol 
of that religion could constitute pressure on the student who did not 
practise that religion.76 The Chamber held that the display in classrooms in 
state schools of a symbol that could reasonably be associated with 
Catholicism, the majority religion in Italy, could not reasonably serve the 
educational pluralism that was essential to the preservation of a democratic 
society and thus restricted the right of parents to educate their children in 
conformity with their convictions and the right of children to believe or not to 
believe.77  The political uproar, which followed the Chamber decision in 
Lautsi, indicated the type of opposition that might flow in a Catholic country 
over the decision that the presence of crucifixes in schools violated the 
ECHR.   
    On a rehearing, the Grand Chamber reversed the decision of the Second 
Section and concluded that the presence of the crucifix was compatible with 
the right of parents to have their children educated in line with their own 
philosophical convictions.78  Although the positive duty on States to act 
neutrally and impartially in ensuring the influence of various religions was 
once again emphasised, the Grand Chamber was not satisfied that the mere 
presence of a crucifix in classrooms could be enough to have a proselytizing 
or indoctrinating effect. The crucifix on the wall was essentially perceived as a 
passive symbol that, in regard to the principle of neutrality, could not be 
deemed to have an influence on pupils as compared to that of didactic speech 
or participation in religious activities.79  Where the state imposes indirect 
restrictions on religious freedom caused by apparently neutral laws of general 
applicability that pursue legitimate secular goals, the Grand Chamber of the 
ECtHR was of the view that the ECHR provides no protection.  This approach 
indicates that, in these cases, there is no state interference with religious 
freedom, even if the philosophical convictions of some parents are 
disregarded, as long as there is no aim to indoctrinate pupils. 
     The Grand Chamber judgment in Lautsi80 found against the parental 
right and denied that a blank school wall (instead of a crucifix) was 
acceptable.81  It is not easy to discern whether this decision of the Grand 
Chamber suggests an understanding of the need for religious and 
ideological pluralism and a more inclusive notion of the neutrality of the 
public sphere, or if such a judgment merely echoes the uncertainties in this 
court as it navigates its way without visible points of reference through the 
complexities of the relationship between religion, law and society.    
Furthermore, so-called neutral laws will not be neutral if they correspond to 
the ethical values or religion of the political majority and impinge on those 
                                                 
76  Lautsi v Italy Grand Chamber, 18 March 2011, Application no 30814/06 para 50.  The 
Chamber had found that crucifixes were perceived as an integral part of the school 
environment and could therefore be regarded as strong symbols within the meaning of the 
decision in Dahlab, in which it had been the state arguing for a secular approach.   
77 Lautsi v Italy Grand Chamber, 18 March 2011, Application no 30814/06, para 57. 
78 Grand Chamber, 18 March 2011, Application no 30814/06, paras 76-7. 
79 Lautsi v Italy Grand Chamber, 18 March 2011, Application no 30814/06, para 72. 
80 Lautsi v Italy Grand Chamber, 18 March 2011, Application no 30814/06.   
81 Lautsi v Italy Grand Chamber, 18 March 2011, Application no 30814/06.   
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with minority beliefs. A delicate balancing act is required without any 
suggestion of overt evaluation82 to ensure that each of these rights 
continues to be respected.83 Neutrality will always be a difficult concept to 
implement and it is argued that there is no such thing is neutrality in 
matters of faith or non-belief. 84  To pretend that there is neutrality is to 
deny the existence of fundamental difference and ultimately to devalue the 
faiths themselves.  However, there can be consensus and compromise and 
neutrality could to be understood in this sense.  
     The GC in Lautsi appeared to give little separate consideration to the rights 
of the children as a religious minority group. The majority opinion of the Grand 
Chamber downplays the significance of the pupils’ experience of religion.85  In 
the past, the Italian judges have been reluctant to listen to children, although 
the Constitutional Court considers Article 12 of the CRC as being immediately 
enforceable in Italian law without need for an implemented legislation.86   
However, the majority judgment of the Grand Chamber does not indicate 
whether children’s actual experience reflects the tradition of tolerance and 
pluralism.  None of the judges of the ECtHR were able to reflect whether the 
children themselves considered that all religions were respected with the 
crucifix on the wall.  It would have been illuminating to know the response of 
Italian children when asked what they consider when they see the crucifix 
(Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist, Christian and atheist children).87  Although 
bestowing religious autonomy on children is subject to the restrictions88 
necessary to protect children from significant harm, the views of children 
require respect in terms of the child’s right to autonomy,89 to be heard90 and 
to form a religious belief.91 
 
THE INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE 
RIGHTS OF THE CHILD (CRC) AND ITS COMMITTEE 
                                                 
82 B Hale ‘Freedom of Religion and Belief ‘ The Annual Human Rights Lecture (Law Society of 
Ireland) on 13 June 2014. http://supremecourts.uk/docs/speech-140613.pdf 
83 Frankie McCarthy ‘Prayers in the Playground: Religion and Education in the United 
Kingdom and Beyond’ in The Place of Religion in Family Law: A Comparative Search (edited 
by Jane Mair and Esin Orucu (Intersentia )(Cambridge, Antwerp , Poland) (2011) 235 at 263. 
84 Julian Rivers ‘Religious Liberty and Education: coping with Diversity’ International 
Conference on Human Rights and our responsibility towards Future Generations: an Inter-
religious Perspective, organized by the Further Generation Programme in Collaboration with 
UNESCO and the Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Students at the Foundation for 
International Students) Valletta, Malta, 6-8 May 1999). 
85 To some extent, Piaget’s theories have been largely discredited by later research (Justin L 
Barrett ‘Do Children Experience God as Adults Do?’ in Religion in Mind” Cognitive 
Perspectives on Religious Belief, Ritual and Experience ed. Jensine Andresen (New York) 
(Cambridge) University Press) (2001) 174 – 6. )  
86 Constitutional Court judgment.1, 2002. 
87  Barbara Bennett Woodhouse ‘Religion and Children’s Rights’ in Religion and Human 
Rights : An Introduction (edited by John Witte, Jr. ad M. Christian Green (Oxford University 
Press) (Oxford) (2012) p.310. 
88 John Eekelaar Family Law and Personal Life (Oxford University Press) 2006 at page 94. 
89 Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority and the DHSS [1986] AC 112. 
90 In terms of their age and maturity and ability to understand the nature and consequences of 
their actions (Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech area Health Authority and the DHSS [1986] 
AC 112.) 
91 Re T (Minors) (Custody: Religious Upbringing) [1981] 2 FLR 239. 
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The CRC has the capacity to accommodate the largely diverse contexts in 
which its provisions are to be realised, but contains potentially diverse and 
confusing interpretations on these issues..92  In the preamble, the CRC 
recognises the importance of the family as the fundamental group of society. 
As far as the family relationship is concerned, it is necessary to focus on the 
right to religious freedom in the context of the child’s relationship with their 
parents and, on the child’s right to a religious or secular education in the 
context of the parental right to educate their children in accordance with their 
convictions in line with Article 2 Protocol 1 of the ECHR. In terms of the ECHR 
and the CRC, the child’s right to religious freedom would appear to be an 
independent right, although it is improbable that a court would uphold very 
young children's right to choose their religious upbringing in the face of 
opposition from both parents, and where there was no evidence of harm as a 
result of the parental choice of religion.93 In terms of the CRC,94 both 
children’s right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion and the rights 
and duties of their parents to provide direction to their children (in a manner 
consistent with the evolving capacities of the child) should be respected.95 
The child’s interest in religious freedom, in accordance with their evolving 
capacities, would suggest that a mature child should be able to engage with 
religious claims and practices and be able, in accordance with this developing 
maturity, to make her own religious judgements.96  In accordance with this, 
the Committee of the CRC has stated that the child must be entitled to 
express views on religious matters before the age of 18, with the family or 
outside it 97 and placed a strong emphasis on the evolving capacities of the 
child.98   
      Although it is stated that children's rights, like human rights, are 
interrelated, certain principles are given precedence such as non-
discrimination (Article 2), the best interests of the child (Article 3), the right 
to life and development (Article 6) and respect for the child’s views (Article 
12). These principles have become both the basis for  children's rights and 
also the major points of tension in the religious rights of children.99 The 
child’s rights to choose a religion are only one part of the human rights 
scheme, which includes respect for parents’ rights and the fact that the 
exercise of such rights is linked to the child’s evolving capacities.100   
                                                 
92  Fiona Orr (2014) 5 The King's Student Law Review pp. 58-77  
93 Carolyn Hamilton Family, Law and Religion (1995) (Sweet and Maxwell) page 198-199. 
94 Article 14. 
95 Article 14 of the CRC. 
96 Harrry Brighouse ‘How Should Children be Hard?’ (2003) 45 Arizona Law Review 691 at 
705. 
97 Summer Record of the 1068th meeting: Finland , UN Doc. CRC/C/SR.1068, para 17 (2005).   
98 Summary Record of the 1101st meeting: Lithuania ,UN Doc. CRC/C/R paragraph36 (2006).   
99J Fortin (2006) ‘Children’s Rights – Substance or Spin?’ Family Law 759, pp760-762. 
100 In Re J (Specific Issue Order: Children’s Religious Upbringing and Circumcision)100 
[2000] 1 FLR 571 (CA) at 575. A dispute had arisen between a non-practising Christian 
mother and a non-practising Muslim father over the circumcision of the child. The court 
issued a prohibited steps order, preventing the father from arranging or permitting the 
boy to be circumcised without the agreement of the court. The court stated that the 
child was too young to belong to a particular religion, focusing on the child’s upbringing 
rather than religion and the child’s rights to make decisions for himself, once competent.  
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     It is significant that Article 14 of the CRC, which contains the child’s right to 
religion is unlike other rights of the child, such as rights to freedom of 
expression, assembly and privacy, in that it is subject to the qualification of 
the obligation of State Parties to respect the rights and duties of parents to 
provide direction for the child.  Parents’ rights are mentioned in regard to the 
child’s freedom of religion, although they are not mentioned in other Articles 
regarding various rights of the child. It would appear that, in respect to 
religion, the CRC regards parents as having rights to shape their child’s 
identity and children cannot be considered in this context as autonomous 
religious beings, without sufficient focus on their links to family and 
community.101 The child’s interests, whilst being prioritised and privileged, are 
not viewed in isolation: they are the primary consideration, but not the only 
one.102  In each case, rights must be balanced against others to determine 
their legitimacy of aim and proportionality in relation to other rights.103 
     Article 12 (2) of the CRC provides that children shall in accordance with their 
age and maturity be provided with the opportunity to be heard in any judicial 
and administrative proceedings affecting them, either directly, or through a 
representative or an appropriate body.  The Committee on the Rights of the 
Child, whilst stressing that the principles set out in Article 12 should be given 
greater priority and that this should be seen as a right and not merely a matter 
of discretion for individual governments,104 provides no hierarchy of Articles 
when conflicts arise.  Article 3 emphasises the best interests of the child, Article 
5 the evolving capacities of the child, Article 12 the participatory right of the 
child and Article 14 the child’s right to freedom of belief. Uncertainty over the 
hierarchy prevails in the Reports of the Committee of the CRC and needs clarity 
to inform its decision- making and provide a steer for the ECtHR.105   
     In the educational context, the CRC has set up an almost irreconcilable 
contradiction in values where respect for religious and cultural identity may 
affect the child’s ability to achieve his or her potential within contemporary 
society.  Article 5 of the CRC attempts to deal with these conflicts 
between parental and children’s rights by recognising the parental role and 
emphasising that both parents, the extended family and the community 
have responsibilities and duties to raise the child in accordance with 
                                                 
However, Wall J went further and stated obiter that where two parents with parental 
responsibility for their infant male child have him ritually circumcised in accordance with the 
tenets of their religions, that exercise of parental responsibility is lawful.   
101 Sylvie Langlaude ‘’Children and Religion under Article 14 of the UNCRC: A Critical 
Analysis’ (2008) 16 International Journal of Children’s Rights’ 475 at 479 
102 Andrew McFarlane ‘”Am I bothered?”: The Relevance of Religious Courts to A Civil Judge’ 
(2011) 41 Family Law 946 at 955; John Eekelaar Family Law and Personal Life (2006) 
(Oxford) 161.   
103 J Fortin, J Hunt and L Scanlan (2012) Taking a longer view of contact: The perspectives of 
young adults who experienced parental separation in their youth. 
104 Jane Fortin Children’s Rights and the Developing Law (2009) (3rd Edition) (Cambridge 
University Press) 42; John Eekelaar ‘The Interest of the Child and the Child’s Wishes:  The 
Role of Dynamic Self-Determinism’ in Philip Alston (ed), The Best Interests of the Child: 
Reconciling Culture and Human Rights (Oxford University Press) (1994) page 161.    
105 Sylvie Langlaude ‘’Children and Religion under Article 14 of the UNCRC: A Critical 
Analysis’ (2008) 16 International Journal of Children’s Rights’ 475 at 501.  Langlaude 
criticised the Committee for interpreting Article 14 in such a way that requires both the 
parents and State to respect the decision of the child and limit their guidance and instruction 
to that which is necessary to support the child in his or religious and moral development. 
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their customs and children themselves enjoy a further right to freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion in terms of article 14 of the CRC.106   The 
parental right to respect for their children’s educational and religious 
upbringing can both conflict with and complement the children’s rights.  
Article 29 (1) (a) of the CRC emphasises the requirement that education 
should develop the child's personality, talents and abilities to their fullest 
potential107 but, by contrast, Article 29 (1) (c) asserts that the child’s 
education should develop respect for the child’s parents and rights to their 
own cultural identity, language and values.108 Children may be brought up 
and nurtured within a particular religion – which does not imply that they 
are necessarily indoctrinated.109     
     The ECtHR has not, as yet, been required to rule on the legality of the 
circumcision of infant males.  The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe has endorsed a report of its Social Affairs and Health Committee, 
which addressed the issue of children’s right to physical integrity, and 
expressed concern about the violation of the physical integrity of children, 
which includes the circumcision of young boys for religious reasons.110   
The Committee on the Rights of the Child has recommended to Israel in its 
July 213 Concluding Observation that the State party undertake a study on 
the short and long-term effects of male circumcision.111  A German court 
has held that a ritual male circumcision performed by Muslim parents on an 
underage child, represents a bodily injury. 112 The case was followed by 
intense reaction from the religious representatives who condemned that 
                                                 
106 A report by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights on the United 
Kingdom's compliance with the CRC suggests that that CRC should be incorporated into 
domestic law and calls for the UK to ratify the Optional Protocol which give individual child 
the ability to petition the Committee of the CRC ton the grounds of alleged violation of their 
rights. The Fifth Periodic Report to the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, May 
2014, 
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CRC%2f
C%2fGBR%2f5&Lang=en Back).  See too R (SG) v Secretary of State for Work and 
Pension [2015] UKSC 16. Scotland has legislated to provide protection in terms of articles 
28 and 29 of CRC (Standards in Scotland Schools Act 2000 s 1.) 
 
108 Article 30 also requires states to respect the right of any child of an ethnic or religious 
minority to enjoy his or her own culture to profess and practise his or own religion.  Article 5 of 
the United Nations Declaration on All forms of Intolerance and Discrimination based on Religion 
or Belief article 5 states the every child shall enjoy the right of access to education in the matter 
of religion or belief in accordance with the wishes of the parents and shall not be compelled to 
receive teaching on religion or belief against their wishes… the best interest of the child being 
the guiding principle.    
 
109 Sylvie Langlaude ‘’Children and Religion under Article 14 of the UNCRC: A Critical 
Analysis’ (2008) 16 International Journal of Children’s Rights’ 475 at 479 c.f. Joel Feinberg 
‘The Children’ sight to an Open Future in W Aitken and H LaFollette (Eds) Whose Child? 
Children’s Rights, Parental Authority and State power (Totowa NJ: Littlefield, Adams, 1980).   
110 Parliamentary Assembly to the Council of Europe (PACE, Resolution 1952 and 
Recommendation 2023 (Provision version on Children's Right to Physical Integrity available a 
http://www.asembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/XRef-DocDetails-EN.asp?FileID=20176&lang=EN 
 
111 UN Committee on the Right of the Child, Concluding Observations on Israel 
(CRC/C?ISR/CO/2-4), para 42. 
112 17/10331. The Court held that the constitutional right of the child to bodily integrity 
outweighed the parents’ religious rights in terms of the education of their children. 
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alleged assault on freedom of religion and calling for legislative 
intervention.  The budestag approved a resolution113 that Jewish and 
Muslim religious life must continue to be possible in Germany. The German 
Parliament enacted a law114 which permits non-therapeutic circumcision 
performed by a medical doctor where the operation does not affect the 
child’s health.  The legislation specified that circumcision is a religious 
choice and not simply a ritual act.  Parliament had been invited to present 
an Act directed at ensuing that ritual male circumcision, performed with 
medical expertise and without unnecessary pain, was permitted, provided 
there was due regard to the constitutional protection of child’s welfare, 
bodily integrity, freedom of religion and the parent’s right to educate their 
children.    
 
THE USE OF ARTICLE 8 TO DEFEND RIGHTS OF THOSE FROM 
RELIGIOUS MINORITIES OR ECCENTRIC RELIGIOUS GROUPS 
    In some cases, the ECtHR has used Article 8 of the ECHR to ensure that 
the rights of individual parents from religious minority or eccentric religious 
groups are not unduly restricted.  In the context of proportionality reasoning 
and balancing of legitimate interests, this line of ECtHR jurisprudence has 
shown a sensitivity and respect for the religious rights of the parties whilst 
not neglecting the best interests of the child.115   For example, in Hoffmann 
v Austria,116 whilst the divorce proceedings were pending, both parents 
applied for custody of the children. The father opposed a grant of custody 
to the applicant, mainly on the ground that she was a Jehovah's Witness.117   
On appeal by the mother to the ECtHR, the ECtHR noted that the children 
had lived with their mother for two years after she had left with them, before 
the judgment of the Supreme Court of Austria compelled her to give them 
up to their father. The Supreme Court’s decision therefore constituted an 
interference with her right to respect for her family life, and the case thus 
fell within the ambit of Article 8 of the ECHR.118   
    The ECtHR accepted that articles 14 and 8 had been violated in that 
there had been a difference in treatment based on the ground of religion.   
The burden was on the state to show a ‘reasonable and objective 
justification' for the difference in treatment: differentiation based on religion 
                                                 
113 17/10331, 2012. 
114 Article 1631d of the BGB.   
115 Hoffmann v Austria [1993] ECtHR (No. 12875/87) (23 June 1993). 
116 [1993] ECtHR (No. 12875/87) (23 June 1993). 
117 The District Court granted custody to the applicant. An appeal by her husband was 
dismissed.   However, the Supreme Court allowed the father’s appeal, holding that the 
education of the children in accordance with the principles of the Jehovah's Witnesses 
violated the provisions of the Religious Education Act and that the lower court had 
disregarded the children's best interests: their contact with that religious group was likely to 
create a risk of their social marginalisation and their inability to consent to receiving blood 
transfusions.    In this case, the applicant was, when she married, a Roman Catholic, as was 
her husband. During the marriage the couple had two children who were baptised as Roman 
Catholics. Subsequently, although the applicant became a Jehovah's Witness, her husband 
and children did not. Following a breakdown of the marriage, the applicant left the matrimonial 
home together with the children. 
118 In view of the nature of the allegations made, the Court considered it appropriate to 
examine the case, as the Commission had, under Article 8 in conjunctions with Article 14 of 
the ECHR. 
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alone was held to be in breach of Article 14.119   Although the aim pursued 
by the judgment of the Austrian Supreme Court was a legitimate one, 
namely the protection of the health and rights of the children, a distinction 
based essentially on a difference in religion alone was not acceptable. The 
ECtHR accepted that the practical consequences of the mother's 
membership of the Jehovah's Witnesses  (the possible effects on the 
children's social life and her total rejection of blood transfusions for her 
children) might be capable of tipping the scales in favour of one parent 
rather than the other.  However, the ECtHR could not find that a reasonable 
relationship of proportionality had existed between the means employed 
and the aim pursued. There had accordingly been a violation of Article 8 in 
conjunction with Article 14. 120 
      More recently, in Vojnity v Hungary121 the ECtHR held that, though the 
domestic courts of Hungary had pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the 
child’s best interests, the decision to remove the divorced applicant’s access 
rights to his son, essentially on grounds of his eccentric religious convictions, 
had discriminated against his exercise of his right to respect for family life on 
the basis of his religion, in violation of Article 14 (discrimination) taken 
together with Article 8 (private and family life). 122   The removal of the son 
from any contact with his father on the grounds of the child’s welfare was not 
a proportionate response to his eccentric religious convictions.  In Vojnity the 
ECtHR was clear that on the facts, there was no evidence that the father’s 
religious convictions involved dangerous practices or exposed his son to 
physical or psychological harm; there was no evidence that the father’s 
insistence on proselytising substantiated a risk of actual harm and there was 
no evidence of any harm which the father’s irrational world views and 
proselytism could have caused to the child.  There were no exceptional 
circumstances to justify the radical step of severing all contact and family life 
between the applicant and his son.  The child’s best interests form part of the 
reasoning of the ECtHR and parental rights are clearly not unlimited. 123  
      Thus, in these cases of disputed custody, the use of Article 8 and the 
principle of proportionality enabled the ECtHR to find that the means 
employed were unjustifiable since they were out of proportion to the need to 
protect the best interests of the child and based on an evaluation of the 
religion which meant that the means used were disproportionate to the aim.  
The ECtHR considered that, in the light of the importance of the rights 
enshrined in Article 8 in guaranteeing the individual’s self-fulfilment, such 
                                                 
119 Hoffmann v Austria [1993] ECtHR (No. 12875/87) (23 June 1993).  
120  Similarly, in Palau-Martinez v France [2003] ECtHR (No. 64927/01) (16 December 2003) 
the French Court of Appeal had held that the children of divorced parents should live with 
their father, noting that their mother was a Jehovah’s Witness, that the Witnesses’ rules for 
the upbringing of children were ‘open to criticism mainly on account of their strictness and 
intolerance and the obligation on children to proselytise’ and concluding that it was ‘in the 
children’s interests to avoid the constraints and prohibitions imposed by a religion whose 
structure resembles that of a sect’.  Following the approach of Hoffmann v Austria, the ECtHR 
held that this decision violated Article 8 of the ECHR since the means employed were 
disproportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. 
121 Application no. 29617/07 [2013] ECHR 131. 
122 Vojnity v Hungary 12 February 2013, ECtHR No 29617/07 At para [42]. 
123 Para [42-44].  
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treatment would only be compatible with the ECHR if very weighty reasons 
existed, such as the protection of the child.124  In Vojnity v Hungary125 the 
ECtHR held that the approach adopted by the authorities amounted to a 
complete disregard of the principle of proportionality, requisite in this field and 
inherent in the spirit of the Convention.  It is this principle which needs to be 
more stringently applied in the context of Article 9 and minority rights. 
BALANCING ON THE TIGHTROPE 
    The ECtHR is faced with the complex task of balancing the competing 
principles of the welfare of the child, the rights of all the parties (including 
the child) to freedom of religion and the parental right to respect for their 
religious or non-religious convictions.126 How should such decisions shape 
the law in a manner that is as consistent as possible with the exercise of 
the rights of religious or non-religious minorities and respect for the parents’ 
philosophical convictions and the child’s right to an open future?127   How 
should the potentially competing principles of the child’s rights and the 
parties’ freedom of religion be proportionately juxtaposed so that there is a 
space in which religious persons are able to confirm their commitment to a 
religion in accordance with their human dignity?  How should the secular 
state cope with the recognition of diverse religious practices of child-
rearing? Should parents, who are part of a religious minority be able to 
bring up their children according to their own values and beliefs, which may 
wholly conflict with the norms of the majority? Should parents be able to 
demand that their children receive an education of a religious nature and 
thus be able to condition their children into specific ways of thinking and 
feeling and to a particular level of intellect solely based on their own moral 
and religious persuasions?  There is always the danger that children’s 
educational opportunities and their rights to an open future128 may well end 
up ‘sacrificed on the altar of the religious freedom’ of their parents.129         
Generally, unless the parents are disputing the religious upbringing of the 
child, the state does not have a primary responsiblity to ensure equality of 
opportunity,130 since this might constitute an uncalled for invasion of a 
protected private sphere131 or a unjustifiable limitation of parental right to 
respect for their religious convictions.132    
                                                 
124 Application no. 29617/07 [2013] ECHR 131. 
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126  Buckley v Buckley [1973] Fam Law 106, and Re B and G (Minors) (Custody) [1985] FLR 
134. 
127 S.E. Mumford ‘The Judicial Resolution of Disputes Involving Children And Religion’ (1998) 
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128 Joel Feinberg ‘The Child’s Rights to an Open future’ in Aiken and LaFollette (eds) Whose 
Child? (1980) 124-153.   
129 Carolyn Hamilton Family, Law and Religion (1995) (Sweet and Maxwell) page 198-199. 
130 Carolyn Hamilton ‘Religious School and Religious Schooling’ in N Lowe and G Douglas 
(eds) Families across Frontiers (1996) 397; John Rawls’ First Principle in A Theory of Justice 
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132 Catherine Henney ‘Education in a Multicultural Society: A Matter of “Fair Equality of 
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    Since each case will depend to some extent on the nature, 
circumstances and context of the individual child,  the ECtHR would need 
to bear in mind that the child does not exist in a vacuum and a balance is 
needed to ensure that other rights are not undermined.133  Discrimination 
between religions is justifiable where the banned religious practice clashes 
with the right and freedoms of others.  However, recognition is needed of 
the plurality of religious communities that exist within many European 
societies and, accordingly, an acceptance that parents of different cultural 
and religious communities will also hold different values regarding the 
education of their children.   The CRC clearly recognises this plurality in 
stating that a child’s education must prepare him or her for ‘responsible life 
in a free society in the spirit of understanding, peace, tolerance, equality of 
sexes and friendship among all people, international and religious groups 
and persons of indigenous origin.’134 If freedom of religion is to be 
observed, it must apply to all religions and not only to the religion of the 
majority.135  
     Undoubtedly, especially in the early years of a child’s life, parental 
automony will  mean that parental religious choices will be respected, but 
this clearly cannot be without question in cases such as circumcision.136   
In considering these complex issues, the ECtHR needs to adhere to a  
‘balancing of rights’ process in the context of a holistic view of the child’s 
welfare. The need for a focus on the human rights of the parties is 
heightened by the fact that, in some cases, there is no allegation of harm to 
the child so the issue of the child’s welfare will never arise unless the 
parents dispute religious aspects of the child’s upbringing or education. A 
consideration of the proportionality and legitimacy of any limitation on 
human rights is likely to produce a more fact-sensitive, contextualised 
judicial approach, taking into account the need for protection of the rights 
and freedom of others.   
     Parental responsibility includes the right to bring up children in a 
particular religious faith, or in none.  The ECtHR may need to examine the 
child’s right to an open future in the case of educational opportunities, but 
in the context of the right of religious minorities (as a group) to freedom of 
religion. Any imposition of state values should be based on a genuinely 
cohesive vision, which, whilst respecting the diverse religious convictions of 
parents, formulates and enforces those values in a legitimate and 
consultative fashion.137   The framework of values in terms of which it is 
lawful for the state to intervene should be clearly established.138    In 
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implementing a holistic exercise, courts need to be sensitive to the fact 
that a tension exists between focussing on the ‘accepted standards of 
the community’139 to determine a child’s welfare and the risk of the 
imposition of majority standards that risk jeopardising that attempt to 
be neutral.140  
 
 CONCLUSION 
This article has discussed some of the challenges for the ECtHR in these 
complex situations. The margin of appreciation doctrine has been widely 
used by the ECtHR, and has permitted States Parties to interpret religious 
rights and freedoms within the broader context of their national cultures and 
traditions. However, the argument that a lack of consensus between the 
law of Contracting States allows a wide margin of appreciation may risk 
jeopardising the protection of minority religious rights, including those of 
children.  To prevent such rights being disproportionately undermined, the 
proportionality test should be strictly applied to balance the goal pursued by 
the religiously restrictive measures as against the impact of a ban on a 
particular group of persons.141  
     An analysis of some of the relevant ECtHR jurisprudence indicates that the 
ECtHR has sometimes denied religious minorities the protection of article 9 of 
the ECHR, justifying national policies that impose, in the public sphere, a 
concept that excludes the visibility of religion, allegedly in the interests of 
secularity. It would seem that, on these occasions,142 the ECtHR, with 
respect, confuses the concept of secularity with that of neutrality. The notion 
of secularity as interpreted by the Turkish and French concepts of laicite and 
ratified by the ECtHR excludes the visibility of religion in some areas of public 
life, especially in educational settings. It would seem that this policy is 
synonymous with an exclusive concept of secularism rather than a concept of 
inclusive neutrality. Neutrality should, wherever possible, in cases of religion 
be implicitly inclusive. Careful balancing of interests in the application of 
Article 9.2 in accordance with the principles of proportionality would help to 
ensure that a pluralist policy is adopted and may prevent a mechanistic or 
deferential application of the margin of appreciation doctrine. 
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